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ARTICLES
MIDGETT v. SACKETT-CHICAGO, INC.:*
THE SHORT-SIGHTED USE OF STATE
REMEDIES TO PROTECT UNION
EMPLOYEES FROM
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
BENJAMIN

P.

HYINK** & LAWRENCE M. LIEBMAN***

INTRODUCTION

For over fifty years,' collective bargaining agreements, 2 arbi*
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and dedication made a difficult task easier. The authors also wish to thank Joanne E. Truschka who demonstrated infinite patience while typing repeated
amendments of text and footnotes.
1. With the emergence of the railroad industry in the United States, the
need for legislative involvement in labor/management relations became fully
manifest. In 1926, Congress responded by enacting the Railway Labor Act,
which has served as the progenitor of the labor legislation which was to follow.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982).
Early congressional labor policy in other areas of industry can best be described as a leap from one act to another, whereby each new enactment was an
attempt to fill the gaps of its predecessor. See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 29-36
(1977). The end result of this legislative evolution is the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). The Labor Management Relations
Act has had two significant effects on federal labor policy. First, the Act has
substantially limited the workers' right to strike. Second, the Act strongly encourages binding arbitration as the preferred method by which to resolve labor
disputes. Note, Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America-An Unfortunate Departureof the ProarbitrationPolicy of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 6 J. CORP. L. 195, 198 (1980).
2. Collective bargaining agreements are agreements between employers
and unions which regulate the terms and conditions of employment. Such
agreements are enforceable by and against the union in matters which affect
either all union members alike or large classes of members. Bogue Elec. Co. v.
Board of Review, 21 N.J. 431, 435, 122 A.2d 615, 618 (1956).
**
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tration rulings s and decisions of federal agencies, 4 such as the National Labor Relations Board,5 have governed the resolution of
labor/management disputes regarding unjustified employment dismissals. In the past, the doctrine of federal preemption 6 of union
employee dismissal law has been eroded where the existing administrative agencies have failed to afford the type of relief sought by
the plaintiff employee under state law. 7 More recently, state courts
have challenged the application of the federal preemption doctrine
in cases where important local policies may be promoted by either
the establishment of civil actions predicated upon state statutes8 or
3. Arbitration rulings are decisions rendered by a private and disinterested
person or panel of persons, chosen by the parties to a disputed question for the
purpose of hearing their contentions and rendering a judgment to which the
litigants voluntarily submit themselves. See Wauregan Mills, Inc. v. Textile
Workers Union of Am., 21 Conn. Supp. 134, 137, 146 A.2d 592, 595 (1958).
4. Where Congress has delegated the administration of a broad statutory
mandate to an agency, the courts are required to defer to the agency judgment.
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 546 F.2d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The courts violate such deference
only when the agency decision is clearly erroneous and unwarranted. Cosgrove
v. Wickard, 49 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Mass. 1943). Therefore, courts have held
that if there exists any rational basis for an agency ruling, it will be upheld.
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Watt, 517 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (D.C. 1981).
What is necessary under a given case to effectuate the policies promoted by
the National Labor Relations Act is to be determined by the National Labor
Relations Board and not the courts. Standard Generator Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 186
F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. West Ky. Coal Co., 116 F.2d 816, 821 (6th
Cir. 1940). Consequently, National Labor Relations Board findings which are
supported by evidence are conclusive upon the courts. Standard Generator
Serv. Co., 186 F.2d at 607. Therefore, administrative decisions, such as those
rendered by the National Labor Relations Board, hold great precedential value
and most often will be respected by the courts.
5. Section 153 of the National Labor Relations Act provides for a National
Labor Relations Board and specifies its powers and duties. 29 U.S.C. § 153
(1982).
6. The doctrine of federal preemption holds that certain matters are of
such national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws take precedence
over state laws, thereby barring the states from asserting jurisdiction. State v.
McHorse, 85 N.M. 753, 757, 517 P.2d 75, 79 (1973). For a more detailed treatment
of the doctrine of federal preemption, see infra note 70.
7. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); J & J Enter. v. Martignetti, 369 Mass. 535, 341 N.E.2d 645 (1976) (action seeking damages for past
conduct should not be dismissed simply because a similar charge is pending
before an administrative agency); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root,
Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1952) (employer not required to pursue action for
damages through National Labor Relations Board).
8. See, e.g., Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981)
(Oklahoma statute prohibiting discharge of workers' compensation claimants
for exercising statutory rights); Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 58, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978) (California statute
prohibiting employer discrimination against workers' compensation claimants);
Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Hawaii 1984) (Hawaiian statute prohibiting
wrongful discharge of workers' compensation claimants), petitionfor cert.filed,
(No. 83-1952); Vaughn v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281
(1980) (Oregon statute prohibiting employer discrimination against workers'
compensation claimants); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980)
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tort remedies9 which seek to deter 10 the wrongful discharge of
union employees. 1 '
Unfortunately, none of the court opinions regarding state remedies for retaliatory discharge 12 has balanced the public interests
favoring federal preemption of employee dismissal law with the
public interests supporting state remedies coincident to those under
federal labor law. While state courts increasingly are focusing attention upon the need to protect union employees from wrongful
discharge,' 3 the rights of employers subject to collective bargaining
agreements are being disregarded. 14 The unravelling of the federal
labor law fabric 15 and the consequent disruption of interstate commerce and predictable labor/management relations 16 are foresee(Texas workers' compensation statute provides for an action to recover damages for wrongful discharge). See also infra note 70 (federal jurisdictional preemption analysis).
9. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill.2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984)
(court-created wrongful discharge tort action maintainable by union
employees).
10. Deterrence, as distinguished from the creation of a remedy to obtain
compensatory relief, is the primary objective of state statutes and tort remedies
for the wrongful discharge of workers' compensation claimants. Ultimately,
the United States Supreme Court will have to address the states' desire to employ deterrent-oriented civil actions and criminal sanctions to support important local public policies when such remedies undermine the collective
bargaining process.
11. See infra note 63.
12. See supra note 8.
13. The five cases cited in footnote eight illustrate the recent development
of state efforts to challenge the federal preemption doctrine when important
state public policies can be furthered by such action. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that all five cases arose from late
1970's to the present. Furthermore, four of these five cases were decided in the
1980's. Therefore, it appears that state challenge to federal preemption, while
in its incipient stage, is becoming more frequent.
14. In any collective bargaining agreement, employees and employers must
offer valuable consideration. The recent trend toward the development of state
deterrent-oriented civil actions treats the reasonable expectations of employers
too lightly with respect to the employees' promise not to litigate employmentrelated disputes outside of the arbitration process. Certainly, the law would not
permit employers to renege on their promises to provide employees with the
extraordinary benefits set forth in collective bargaining agreements. Yet, the
opposite holds true for those obligations entertained by employees under these
same agreements.
15. Contracting parties must be able to rely upon their bargaining partners
to honor the commitments contained in their agreements. However, the employees' promise to forego litigation in favor of arbitration proceedings is made
with the express understanding that the union shall be the advocate of the employees. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 226 (1983). Employers rely on unions to screen grievances which are frivolous, factually
unfounded, or malicious. The states' encouragement of employee civil actions
in lieu of arbitration proceedings heightens the potential for employee abuse of
procedural remedies.
16. In Midgett, the court justified its action by the need to support a strong
public policy in favor of workers' compensation protection. Midgett v. SackettChicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 147, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (1984). Other public
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able products of the expansion of state remedies for allegedly
wrongful dismissals.
The failure to balance the problems inherent in state remedies
for wrongful discharge with the benefits obtained by affording opportunities for the private enforcement of state public policies is
apparent in the recent Illinois Supreme Court holding in Midgett v.
Sackett-Chicago, Inc.17 In Midgett, a union employee alleged that
he had been discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.' 8 The court held that a union employee who is wrongfully discharged and protected by a collective bargaining agreement
may bypass the contract remedies provided by the agreement and,
instead, directly pursue an action in tort for retaliatory discharge. 19
The court emphasized 2° the strong public policy in favor of protecting the rights of employees under the Workers' Compensation
Act. 21 The court had previously held that a recovery of punitive
damages 22 was necessary in at-will 23 employment termination cases
policies, such as the one in favor of free speech, are currently being presented to
the Illinois Supreme Court as a basis for independent civil actions in Illinois.
E.g., Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 979, 469 N.E.2d 1245 (1984)
(Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal filed, No. 60446); Kelso-Burnett Co. v. Barr, Ill. App. Ct.
appeal dismissed, June 13, 1984 (Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal filed, No. 60426); Mein v.
Masonite Corp., 124 Ill. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1127 (1984) (Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal
filed, No. 60422); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 539, 462
N.E.2d 1262 (1984) (Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal filed, No. 60181). If states are permitted
to create civil actions for employees merely on the basis of a state public policy
being adversely affected by the alleged actions of an employer, employees will
foreseeably bring actions as diverse as the creativity of the common law lawyer's mind. Such a development would render completely ineffectual the arbitration provisions of existing collective bargaining agreements.
17. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
18. Id
19. Id. at 145, 473 N.E.2d at 1282. Justice Moran, dissenting, recognized the
ill effects that the majority opinion could have on federal labor policy by stating
that he could not "agree that the expectations created by the collective-bargain-

ing agreement should be entirely overlooked by allowing the union employee to

completely circumvent the mutually agreed upon grievance procedure." Id. at
152, 473 N.E.2d at 1287 (Moran, J., dissenting). Justice Moran suggested that
the retaliatory discharge tort action was intended to be merely "a narrow exception" to the terminationat-will rule and was created solely for the purpose
of providing a remedy to the wrongfully discharged at-will employee. Id,
20. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 145, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.30 (1983).
22. The emergence of punitive damages in the common law has been traced
to Eighteenth Century England. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 518 (1957); Note, Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus
Co.-Punitive DamagesNonrecoverable Under the Illinois Survival Act, 7 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 811, 812 (1976). They were then employed to justify jury verdicts in
excess of the plaintiff's actual harm, thereby enabling the plaintiff to obtain
compensation for intangible elements of damage which were not recoverable at
early common law. McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 571, 572 (1978). As the law progressed, however,
civil damage recoveries were expanded to include intangibles, satisfying the
need for which the doctrine of punitive damages was intended. Id. Today, puni-
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to deter employers from interfering with the filing of workers' compensation claims. 24 Therefore, to uniformly protect the right of all
tive damages are employed for the purpose of punishment and deterrence. See
infra text accompanying note 110.
23. Unlike the discharge rights provided to organized employees, at-will
employees are without contractual job protection. In an at-will employment
setting, the employee or employer may terminate employment at any time,
without notice and "for a good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
Accord Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878 (1981). In contrast, an employment contract which provides for a fixed
term may be terminated only for justifiable cause.
The termination-at-will doctrine has been a part of American labor law
since the days of the Industrial Revolution. An employer's unrestricted right to
fire employees was an important component of the prevailing laissez-fair economic philosophy during that era. One commentator has noted the importance
of the termination-at-will doctrine to the rapid industrial development of Nineteenth Century America:
The rule was adopted in a milieu of an emerging industrial society. The
latter part of the nineteenth century was a period of tremendous economic
development . . . in which entrepreneurs ran heavy risks . . . [avoidable]
only by great skill and good fortune. So that these risks might be minimized and industry encouraged to expand, courts created a legal framework to protect the employer.
Comment, A Common Law Action for the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1440 (1975). See, e.g., Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1981) (under Georgia and Texas law, dismissal in retaliation for refusing to commit perjury in deposition not actionable
absent contract provisions to the contrary); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d
134, 135 (6th Cir. 1979) (Ohio permits parties to terminate oral contract not containing duration provision at any time); see generally Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) (detailing historical development of at-will doctrine).
24. In 1978, the tort of retaliatory discharge was recognized as a cause of
action in Illinois for the first time. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978), the Illinois Supreme Court allowed an at-will employee to
recover damages against an employer who had discharged her in retaliation for
filing a workers' compensation claim. The court reasoned that an "employer's
otherwise absolute power to terminate an employee at will should [not] prevail
when that power is exercised to prevent the employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Workers' Compensation Act." Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at
357. The court found the need to create the cause of action for retaliatory discharge because without such an action, there would be no insurance that at-will
employees would be able to freely exercise their rights under the Workers'
Compensation Act without the risk of a retaliatory discharge by an employer
against whom the employees had no protection. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
Furthermore, it was held that such a recovery may include both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 186, 384 N.E.2d at 359. In the absence of other
effective means of deterrence, the court found it necessary to permit the recovery of punitive damages to prevent the discharge of at-will employees for exercising their statutory rights. Id. Although punitive damages are generally not
recoverable in wrongful discharge actions, because such actions have traditionally been based upon contract theory and actions sounding in contract normally
do not give rise to claims for punitive damages, in Kelsay, the newly-created
retaliatory discharge cause of action was premised upon a separate and in-
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private 2 5 employees to file workers' compensation claims, the court
concluded that the tort action of retaliatory discharge and the availability of punitive damages must be extended to union employees. 26
Concern regarding the protection of workers' compensation
claimants is shared by other courts. 27 These jurisdictions, however,
have only recognized a remedy based upon state statute. 28 Until
Midgett,29 no jurisdiction had held that the common law of the state
permitted a punitive damages award to deter wrongful conduct by a
private employer of union members. This article will criticize

Midgett's radical departure from established labor law.
Initially, an examination of the availability of adequate remedies for the wrongful discharge of union employees who are protected by collective bargaining agreements will be presented.
Thereafter, the article will examine the detrimental effects resulting from the creation of state statutory and common law civil actions which seek to deter wrongful conduct by employers. Finally,
a proposal which protects union employees subject to collective bargaining agreements and which accommodates valid state concerns
regarding the enforcement of local public policies is offered. The
proposal advocates that the present system of arbitration and administrative appeal predicated upon collective bargaining agreements is the proper remedy for discharged employees.
dependent tort, and therefore, the proper context for a recovery of punitive
damages existed. Id. at 187, 384 N.E.2d at 359-60.
In 1981, the retaliatory discharge cause of action was extended one step
further. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981), an at-will employee was discharged for supplying local law enforcement officials with information indicating criminal activity on the part of a fellow employee. The court held that when an at-will employee's discharge
contravenes clearly mandated policy, a tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge may be maintained. Id. at 129-32, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79. Therefore,
Palmateerestablished a non-statutory court-implied public policy exception to
the termination-at-will doctrine.
Kelsay and Palmateerprovided a tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge which could only be maintained by the at-will employee. This limitation
on the class of plaintiffs who could maintain retaliatory discharge actions was
fully upheld until the court's decision in Midgett.
25. This article concerns exclusively wrongful dismissal law as it pertains to
the private sector employee. Section 152(2) of the National Labor Relations Act
provides that "the United States ... [and] any State or political subdivision
thereof" are not "employers" under the Act and therefore, pursuant to § 152(3),
individuals who are employed by such entities are not "employees." 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(2)-152(3) (1982). Consequently, the wrongful dismissal law which applies to public employees is distinguishable from that of private employees and
therefore, is beyond the scope of this article.
26. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
27. See supra note 8.
28. See supra note 8.
29. 105 Ill. 2d at 144, 473 N.E.2d at 1281.
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REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNION EMPLOYEES FOR WRONGFUL
CONDUCT OF EMPLOYERS AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES

The general rule30 under federal labor law policy compels the
resolution of labor/management dismissal disputes through the
available arbitration and administrative review process, thereby
making the employee whole. 3 ' This rule is predicated upon the
doctrine of preemption. 32 The rule 33 has not been employed where

the particular type of relief sought by the employee may not be obtained under the enforcement of existing collective bargaining
4
agreements or by the enforcement of federal labor laws.3
Each exception to federal preemption erodes employers' adherence to the arbitration and administrative review processes causing
an unforeseeable burden of litigation costs and delays. 35 As collective bargaining agreements, negotiated in good faith, become more
onerous for employers, these employers will become less willing to
afford employees higher wages and other comprehensive employment benefits generally not made available to at-will employees.se
30. The United States Supreme Court has noted that an employee who
wishes to.assert a contract grievance against his employer "must attempt use of
the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the
mode of redress." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
31. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983).
32. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Congress may designate certain areas of human activity as exclusively the domain
of the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Accordingly, Congress has
designated the area of federal labor law generally and unfair labor practices, in
particular, as the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Basically, states are not permitted to create alternative and substantial remedies to those provided to employees protected by collective bargaining
agreements.
33. See supra note 30.
34. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983). For a thorough discussion
of Belknap, see Anderson, "Permanent"Replacements of Strikers After Belknap: The Employer's Quandary,18 J. MAR. L. REV. 321 (1985).
35. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
36. Through the collective bargaining process, union employees obtain substantial benefits rarely provided to at-will employees. By providing additional
financial benefits and other work incentives, employers hope to obtain a dispute
resolution process which is rapid and cost-efficient. In exchange, union employees may obtain wages and fringe benefits above those provided to at-will employees. Collective bargaining agreements may include such commonplace
benefits as higher wages, additional paid holiday vacations, layoff compensation,
and protection against dismissal without just cause, as well as more special benefits such as technical displacement provisions and supplemental employment
compensation benefits. For an exhaustive list of the special benefits contained
in a collective bargaining agreement, see THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (10th ed. 1983). For a general review of collective bargaining issues, see G. BEREND', COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1984).
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While union employees have the right to strike,37 management in
recent years has gravitated toward jurisdictions with "right to
work" legislation.3 8 Therefore, the ultimate viability of unions
rests upon the willingness of employers to engage in the collective
bargaining process. 39 Consequently, the superior compensation afforded to union employees is dependent upon the limitation of exceptions to the scheme of grievance and arbitration procedures.
Such exceptions should only be recognized where the employee can
not be made whole.
Available Remedies for Retaliatory Discharge
The primary shortcoming of the Midgett decision is the court's
failure to address the issue of federal preemption.40 Collective bar37. Section 157 of the National Labor Relations Act states in part: "Employees shall have the right ...to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982). Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for
employees by this section. Section 163 also concerns the right to strike. 29
U.S.C. § 163. It reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act ...shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Id It is clear from a
reading of these two provisions that the law guarantees the right of employees
to strike.
38. To date, eighteen states have enacted "right to work" laws: See ALA.
CODE §§ 25-7-30 - 27-7-37 (1984); ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 35; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 81-201 - 81-205; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 6; GA. CODE §§ 34-6-20 - 34-6-28 (1984);

IOWA CODE §§ 736A.1-736A.8 (1984); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-831 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 981-987 (1984); Miss. CONST. art. 7,
§ 198-A; MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1983); NEB. CONST. art. 15, §§ 13-15; NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-217 - 48-219 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.230-613.300 (1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 - 95-84 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-7-10 - 41-7-90
(1984); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 60-8-3 - 60-8-8 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 501-201 - 50-1-204 (1984); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 5207A (Vernon 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34-34-2 - 34-34-17 (1984); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-58 - 40.1-69 (1984); WYO.
STAT. §§ 27-245.1 - 27-245.8 (1984).
39. Apparently unions are becoming less inclined to seek a redress of members' grievances through the National Labor Relations Board. A recent analysis
of the records of the National Labor Relations Board indicates a drop in the
number of new cases filed on an annual basis of 21% between fiscal year 1980
and fiscal year 1983 which ended on September 30, 1984. In the last year, the
number of new cases filed dropped by 13%. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 1.
If union grievances are increasingly presented in state trial courts instead
of in arbitration proceedings, the litigation costs for employers will dramatically
rise. Employers will become less willing to enter agreements which are unilaterally enforceable. When the costs of doing business with unions exceeds the
cost of seeking available alternatives to union representation, employers will
become more likely to move their businesses to other locations where unions
are less prevalent. See infra note 149.
40. Although counsel for Sackett-Chicago raised the issue that Mr. Midgett
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not specifically raised
until the present counsel for Sackett-Chicago presented this issue in support of
its petition for rehearing. Counsel for Mr. Midgett successfully moved to strike
the federal preemption argument from the brief of Sackett-Chicago on the the-
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gaining agreements protecting union employees from dismissal for
other than just cause 41 allow a discharged employee to obtain reinstatement with full backpay, 42 interest from the date of discharge
until the date of reinstatement, 43 and attorneys' fees.44 Because
such employees are entitled to be made whole under federal labor
law, 45 the doctrine of preemption should have barred the Illinois
Supreme Court from exercising jurisdiction to extend a tort remedy
to union employees.
Concern regarding the ability of union employees to be made
whole through federal labor law was openly expressed in the Illi-

nois appellate court's opinion in Midgett46 and during the subsequent oral arguments 47 conducted before the Illinois Supreme
Court. Specifically, the court focused upon the likelihood of union
employees in small shops and factories having to confront barriers
to the legitimate enforcement of their rights under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act because of the intimacy between management and labor in such a working environment. 48 This intimacy
ory that the argument had been waived in the lower courts. As a result, the
majority opinion neglected to comment upon the jurisdictional support for the
creation of a new tort remedy for union employees protected by a collective
bargaining agreement.
41. In a recent analysis of over four hundred collective bargaining agreements, grounds for discharge were set forth in 94% of the contracts. Approximately 83% of the agreements contained "cause" or "just cause" provisions. In
essence, employees who may be discharged for less than just cause are at-will
employees even though the collective bargaining agreement sets forth certain
conditions of their employment. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 6-11 (10th ed. 1983).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
43. Recently, the NLRB raised back pay interest rates from 11% to 13%.
NLRB Raises Back Pay Interest Rate, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 6, 1985, at 1.
44. Litigation costs and attorneys' fees ordinarily are not recoverable under
the National Labor Relations Act. C. MORRIS, DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1680
(1983). However, an award of attorneys' fees and the reimbursement of court
costs may be awarded by the Board in cases of frivolous employer defenses or
outrageous employer conduct. Id.
45. See supra note 31.
46. 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d 1092 (1983).
47. The Midgett case was consolidated with a case entitled Gonzalez v.
Prestress Eng'g Corp., No. 59350 (Ill. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 19, 1984), which itself
was consolidated with Repyak v. Prestress Eng'g Corp. Counsel for those plaintiffs told the court during oral argument that retaliatory discharges are tantamount to the employer practices that touched off the Chicago Haymarket
Square Riot in 1884. Chicago Daily L. Bull., June 27, 1984, at 1. Furthermore,
counsel argued that employers effectively discourage the filing of workers' compensation claims by this termination practice. Id
48. Apparently, the Illinois Supreme Court was persuaded by the argument
that unions were incapable of effectively protecting employees from the coersive influence of employers who seek to prevent the filing of workers' compensation claims. The court chose to quote that portion of the Illinois Appellate
Court decision which provided:
The recognition of a cause of action in tort merely allows an employee an
additional remedy in areas where strong public policies, as opposed to

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:565

can potentially impair the willingness of union representatives to
fulfill their responsibilities to the worker. 49 Therefore, it is apparent that the Illinois Supreme Court, like other state courts and legislatures, 50 has concluded that the state must seek its own means to
deter wrongful discharges by employers in contravention of state
public policy. 51 Certainly, the threat of protracted litigation with a

former employee will deter the employer from abusing his position
of power over an employee who seeks to lawfully exercise rights
guaranteed by state law. The additional threat of a punitive damages award far in excess of the actual injury to the employee will
further advance the deterrence goal sought by the state.
On the other hand, such state civil actions have a chilling effect
upon the exercise of the employers' right to discharge incompetent
or otherwise inappropriate employees for just cause. Under federal
labor law, an extensive built-in filtering process exists.52 Through
arbitration, 53 administrative review, 54 or direct action in the United
States district courts,55 an employee discharged for other than just
cause can have his claim fully adjudicated. However, state deterrent-oriented causes of action open the door for angry and disgruntled former employees to harass their ex-employers with
unsubstantiated wrongful discharge claims.5 At the very least,
purely private interests, are involved. Such an alternative is especially necessary and desirable in a case such as this where there has been an allegation of collusion between the union and the employer.
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 9, 454 N.E.2d 1092, 1094
(1983).
49. See infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
51. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
52. Unions are able to refuse to represent employees with frivolous or unjustified claims. See infra note 72. Arguably valid claims may be more closely
examined during an arbitration proceeding when the employee has an opportunity to present evidence in support of his position. Such a two-step filtering
process is much less expensive than routine trial court litigation where contested issues of fact must be fully presented before claims without merit can be
dismissed.
53. Arbitration proceedings routinely offer employees a greater opportunity to present all potentially related facts which might otherwise be inadmissible in a trial court.
54. Administrative agencies or boards, such as the National Labor Relations
Board, may elect to rehear the evidence presented to the arbitrator or may rely
upon the transcript of the proceedings conducted before the arbitrator. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
55. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides for the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts to adjudicate actions "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization in an industry
affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
56. The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party may present a
motion within thirty (30) days of the entry of a judgment or the dismissal of a
cause of action for reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by reason of untrue
pleadings presented by an opposing litigant. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611
(1983). However, unemployed former employees are often, for all practical pur-
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such litigants will obtain the revenge they seek and, in some instances, unearned severance pay in the form of a nuisance suit
57
settlement.
Because the Midgett court was so intent on deterring wrongful
discharges of workers' compensation claimants, the court failed to
address any rational reason to afford the extraordinary relief of punitive damages to at-will employees, while denying the opportunity
for a windfall to union members. 58 A careful consideration of the
federal remedies available to union members, even if inadequately
represented by the union,5 9 would have led the court to the conclusion that union employees will be hurt, more than helped, by the
tort remedy of retaliatory discharge.
Available Federal Remedies for Breach of a Union's Duty of Fair
Representation
Where an adequate federal remedy exists against a union conspiring with an employer contrary to the interests of a wrongfully
discharged union employee, the federal preemption doctrine supports reliance on established statutory remedies to the exclusion of
state law actions. 60 When Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 it stated its preference for employing contractual grievance procedures to settle disputes arising in the
organized workplace. 62 Therefore, where a union acts as an exclusive bargaining agent for a group of employees, 63 it is obligated to
represent those employees with "complete good faith and honesty
of purpose." 64 The United States Supreme Court has held that this
poses, judgment proof because they lack the income or assets necessary to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees obtained under § 2-611. Id.
57. Employers are faced with the difficult decision of offering irresponsible
litigants several hundred dollars to dismiss their complaint, or pay legal fees of
hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars to ultimately obtain the dismissal of
frivolous litigation.
58. 105 Ill. 2d at 147, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
59. See infra note 78.
60. See infra note 70.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
62. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). See supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
63. Employees who are not members of the union, but are subject to the
collective bargaining agreement and pay dues under the "agency shop clause,"
are entitled to the same union representation as employees who are members.
Nikiel v. Buffalo, 75 A.D.2d 1017, 429 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1980). Accord Port Drum
Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 555 (1968).
64. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). In Huffman, the
employee plaintiff brought a class action against his employer and union claiming that the plaintiff class had been lowered in seniority status due to provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement giving veterans seniority credit for service in the armed forces prior to their employment. Id.at 333-35. While the
named plaintiff was a veteran, he had been working for the defendant employer
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duty arises from statutory enactment, 65 and courts have often
66
stated that the union's duty is fiduciary in nature.
When a union employee feels that his discharge was wrongful,
three modes of redress under the federal system are available. Generally, the employee must attempt 67 to utilize available grievance

procedures 68 under the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
However, where the collective bargaining agreement does not provide that the grievance procedures stated therein are exclusive, the
69
employee may present the grievance to the employer directly.

If

the discharge can arguably be characterized as an unfair labor pracprior to his military service, while other employees had been given the same
credit for military service undergone prior to their employment with the defendant employer. Id at 335. The plaintiff contended that his union had no
authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement which provided employees with seniority credit for military service performed prior to employment. Id. at 336. The United States Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 334.
The Court noted that unions have a duty, based on sections seven and nine
of the National Labor Relations Act, to "make an honest effort to serve the
interests" of all members of the bargaining unit. Id. at 337. The Court held that
since the union represented all of the employees at the plant in question, it did
have the authority to agree to the contested contract provisions because such
provisions were reasonable. Id. at 342.
65. Id. at 337.
66. E.g., Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2206, United Mine Workers, 400 Pa. 145,
169, 161 A.2d 882, 895 (1960) (union is trustee of employees' grievance rights).
67. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). Generally, the
issue concerning the attempt to utilize available grievance procedures arises in
tandem with a defense that the employee failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. However, numerous exceptions to the exhaustion requirement abound. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967), the Supreme Court
noted that there is no need for prior exhaustion where the employer's conduct
amounted to a repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement altogether.
Similarly, in suits between the employee and the union, the union is estopped
from defending on the ground of failure to exhaust agreement grievance procedures where the union wrongfully refuses to process the grievance. Id.
In a number of cases where the employee brought suit against the union,
the union interposed the defense of failure to exhaust intraunion remedies.
However, where those procedures could not reactivate a grievance that had expired as a result of the union's wrongful activity or could not award the employee the complete relief sought, no exhaustion need be shown. Clayton v.
United Auto Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 693 (1981). Accord Rupe v. Spector Freight
Sys., Inc., 679 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1982). Other courts have carved out additional
exceptions. See, e.g., Martin v. Kansas City S.R. Co., 197 F. Supp. 188 (D. La.
1961) (futility, unfairness, and hostile discrimination); Neider v. J.G. Van
Holten & Son, 41 Wis. 2d 602, 165 N.W.2d 113 (1969) (inordinate delay).
68. Where internal union procedures do not provide redress for the particular grievance, there is no requirement imposed on the employee to exhaust procedures. Varra v. Dillon Cos., 615 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1980).
69. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). This right is
subject to the proviso that "the bargaining representative has been given the
opportunity to be present at the adjustment." Id
A similar provision applies to employer/employee relationships governed
by the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1982). In this context, however, a railroad employee need not exhaust the statutory right before bringing
an action against his union. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 28 (1970).

1985]

Union Employees and Retaliatory Discharge

tice, 70 the employee may also seek redress before the National La70. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). In
Garmon, unions picketed an employer's store for the purpose of exerting pressure on the employer's customers and suppliers not to deal with the employer
until the employer agreed to only hire union employees. Id at 237. The employer petitioned a California state court for an injunction and damages and
concurrently began proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. Id.
at 237-238. While the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction, due to failure of
the amount of money at issue to reach the Board's minimum jurisdictional
amount, the California court entered an injunction against the unions and
awarded the employer $1000 in damages. I& The California Supreme Court
affirmed on the ground that failure of the NLRB to assert jurisdiction, gave the
state power to resolve the dispute. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council,
45 Cal. 2d 657, 663, 291 P.2d 1, 5 (1955). The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure of the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction did not give
state courts power to adjudicate over activities they otherwise would be preempted from regulating. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S.
26 (1957). The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether California law alone could support the award of damages. On remand,
the California Supreme Court dissolved the injunction, but held that the award
of damages was based on California tort law as the union activity was an unfair
labor practice under state tort law. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council,
49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 236. The
Court held that since the union picketing was arguably prohibited by sections
seven and eight of the National Labor Relations Act, neither state nor federal
courts have jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Id. at 245. The Court concisely
stated its reasoning as follows:
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from
state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or
grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities
that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme. It
may be that an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact,
conflict with the active assertion of federal authority. The same may be
true of the incidence of a particular state injunction. To sanction either
involves a conflict with federal policy in that it involves allowing two lawmaking sources to govern.
Id. at 246-47 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court clarified the Garmon rule in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978). In deciding whether the Garmon rule preempted an employer's civil
action to enjoin union picketing on employer property, the Court stated:
The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law
relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but
whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or
different from ... that which could have been, but was not, presented to
the Labor Board.
Id at 197.
In its modified opinion in Midgett, the Illinois Supreme Court placed reliance on one federal and four state cases in support of its position that union
employees may bypass grievance and arbitration procedures and proceed directly to state court to maintain a retaliatory discharge action against the employer. 105 Ill. 2d at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1285. Namely, the court placed reliance
on Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Judson Steel Corp.
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 58, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250
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(1978); Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Hawaii 1984); Vaughn v. Pacific N.W.
Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980); and Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980). A closer examination of these cases reveals, however,
that the Midgett court's reliance on these cases was misplaced.
Neither the Judson Steel Corp. nor the Borner courts addressed the Garmon rule or any other matter of federal labor policy. However, the Peabody
Galion, Puchertand Vaughn courts did address the Garmon preemption rule.
The Vaughn case dealt with Oregon statutes barring discrimination against
workers' compensation claimants and barring refusal to reinstate injured employees. Vaughn, 289 Or. at 73, 611 P.2d at 281. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.410
and 659.415 (1979). Further, the aggrieved employee was given the right to seek
an order of reinstatement and an award of back pay. Id. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.121(1) (1979).

In Puchert, Hawaiian statutes barred discrimination against workers injured on the job and provided for hearing before the department of labor which
could order reinstatement with an award of back pay. Puchert,677 P.2d at 449.
See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-32, 378-33, 378-35 (1976). The Peabody Galion
case involved Oklahoma statutes barring discharge of workers' compensation
claimants and allowing civil actions for violations where the aggrieved employee could obtain reinstatement and an award of "reasonable damages."
Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1309. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 5-7 (Supp. 1980).
In each of these cases, the respective courts held that the Garnon preemption rule was inapplicable. Vaughn, 289 Or. at 82, 611 P.2d at 287 ("such a claim
does not disserve the interests promoted by federal labor relations law");
Puchert,677 P.2d at 456 ("such regulation by the state does not interfere with
the scheme and purpose of the RLA"); Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1319 ("statute is not facially preempted by any of the federal labor laws"). All the courts
claimed that the respective statutes fell within an exception to the rule, announced in Garmon, which allows states to regulate activity which is a "peripheral concern" of the L.M.R.A., or where the regulated conduct touches interests
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
What each of these courts failed to realize is that the state statutory remedies could potentially conflict with the remedies available from the NLRB. As
the NLRB has power to order reinstatement and award back pay, it does not
take much imagination to foresee instances where an aggrieved employee maintains actions before a state tribunal and the NLRB with differing results. See 28
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Further, this potential of conflict ignores the Supreme
Court's primary concern of having "two law-making sources" governing the
same fact setting.
Further, these courts ignored the Sears holding. In each case the Labor
Board and the court would have had to adjudicate the exact same issue, to wit,
whether the employee was discharged for "just cause" or whether the employee
was discharged for filing for worker's compensation benefits. The NLRB has
determined that discharge of an employee for such a claim is an unfair labor
practice under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B.
1053 (1979), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980). Recently, the
Court has noted that "defining the scope of [29 U.S.C. § 157] is for the Board to
perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come
before it." NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1510 (1984).
Additionally, all three cases and the Illinois Supreme Court in Midgett, attempted to rely on the case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974). In Alexander, the United States Supreme Court held that a union employee, who was protected by a collective bargaining agreement with grievance
procedures and who had alleged racial discrimination in his discharge grievance, was not precluded from maintaining an action under the Civil Rights Act.
Id. at 60. The Court reasoned that "a contractual right to submit a claim to
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bor Relations Board.
When presented with a meritorious 7 2 employee grievance
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 73 the union
must, pursuant to its duty to fairly represent the employee, 74 process the grievance in good faith.75 If the union fails to properly
process the grievance, then the employee may seek a judicial remedy and maintain an action against both his employer 76 for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement and against his union 77 for
its breach of the duty of fair representation. 78 Even if the union's
arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination." Id. at 52.
There can be no doubt that Congress can create exceptions to rules of law
which are solely within its power to legislate upon. For the Vaughn, Puchert
and Peabody Galion courts to equate state statutory exceptions to federal law
with those created by Congress, is to allow state legislatures power to invalidate
the supremacy clause at will. See supra note 32 and infra note 158.
71. Section eight of the National Labor Relations Act defines employer and
union unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Section nine of the Act
provides procedures for filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Board. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
72. The general rule is that a grievance must be meritorious before the
union has a duty to process it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
NLRB v. Eldorado Mfg. Corp., 660 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1981). Furthermore,
unions are entitled to make a good faith determination of the likelihood of success on the merits and may consider the costs and benefits of processing a grievance to arbitration. Higdon v. United Steelworkers of Am., 537 F. Supp. 653
(S.D. Ga. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1983). Certainly, this process
eliminates many frivolous and unsubstantial claims which might otherwise congest the state and federal court system.
73. Where the particular grievance involved is excluded by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, the union is not under a duty to process the
grievance. Kaplan v. Ruggieri, 547 F. Supp. 707, 712 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), affd, 722
F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1983).
74. See supra note 63.
75. Mere negligence in handling a grievance does not constitute a lack of
good faith on the union's part. Wyatt v. Interstate Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d
888 (4th Cir. 1980); Foster v. Bowman Transp. Co., 562 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ala.
1983). Contra Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782
(1960).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
77. Today, there is no question of an employee's standing to bring suit
against his union in a proper case. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). However,
prior to Vaca, some courts barred such suits. Kordewick v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 181 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1950); Martin v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 197 F.
Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1961); McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 59
Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938). The asserted argument was that a union is
merely an unincorporated association and therefore, applying the common law
rule, the member/employee could not sue the association for the actions of its
agents as the member/employee would, in effect, be suing himself.
78. Generally, the duty of fair representation is deemed to be breached
when the union acts with gross nonfeasance, hostile discrimination, arbitrariness or capriciousness. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 26 (1970). It has been
held that this requires the union to act with some degree of conscious misfeasance or dereliction. Lewis v. American Postal Workers Union, 561 F. Supp.
1141, 1148 (W.D. Va. 1983). Furthermore, the employee must prove that the
union hostility is intentionally directed at the complaining employee in particu-
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failure to process the grievance is deemed to be an unfair labor
practice,7 9 the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
does not preempt the courts from adjudicating the employee's
rights.80
Among the remedies which can be granted to the aggrieved employee are an order requiring arbitration of the grievance s ' and an
award of damages against the union. The measure of the award
would equal the increase in damages suffered by the employee resulting from the union's breach of its duty of fair representation to
the extent that its failure to process the grievance added to the employee's damages.8 2 While it had been previously thought that such
damages would be de minimis,8 3 the United States Supreme Court
recently held that such damages could be quite substantial.8 4
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service,8 5 an employee had
been suspended without pay and was then permanently discharged
for fighting with a co-employee. 86 The employee brought suit
against the Postal Service for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement and against his union for breach of the duty of fair replar. Superczynski v. P.T.O. Servs. Inc., 706 F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1983). Therefore, for example, when a union representative fails to adequately prepare for
an arbitration hearing and fails to notify the employee of that hearing, the
union's duty to fairly represent the employee is deemed to have been breached.
Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 258 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Va. 1966).
There are numerous other situations that have been held to constitute a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Lonza,
658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981) (failure to timely file grievance); Harrison v. United
Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975) ("trading" employee's grievance for
favorable result in another employee's grievance); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (racial
discrimination), cert denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Thompson v. Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963) (failure to represent employee
because he was only an occasional member of union); NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers Lodge, 231 F.2d 298, 299 (7th Cir. 1956) (refusal to process grievance until
employees pay "voluntary weekly donation" to union strike fund), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956); Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc., 210 N.L.R.B. 943 (1974) (sex
discrimination), enforced, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975).
Generally, the union can defend on the ground that the decision not to process the grievance was based on rational consideration of all available facts, including the consideration of the interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit. Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1976). For a more
detailed discussion of this subject, see generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 372 (1970)
and Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 884 (1970).
79. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB
v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
80. Vaca, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
81. Id. at 196.
82. Id. at 197-98.
83. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979).
84. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
85. Id,
86. Id. at 214.
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resentation for failure to take his grievance to arbitration. 7 In instructing an advisory jury on the Vaca v. Sipess8 rule concerning
apportionment of damages,8 9 the trial court instructed the jury to
select a hypothetical date on which the employee would have been
reinstated had the union properly handled the grievance. 90 Pursuant to the trial court's instructions, the jury was to determine the
total damage, if any, suffered by the employee as a result of the
alleged wrongful discharge. 91 The court then suggested that the
Postal Service would be liable for damages up to the hypothetical
date of reinstatement 92 and the union would be liable for any damages incurred thereafter. 93 Over a vigorous dissent, 94 the United
States Supreme Court, in effect, approved this apportionment
95

rule.

As a result of Bowen, unions are now subject to heavy potential
liability for breach of the duty of fair representation. Under Bowen,
g
all damages accruing after the "hypothetical reinstatement date"
are the union's primary responsibility. 97 By the time a Bowen-type
case comes to trial in any of our country's more congested court
systems, the union can be held liable for several years of backpay,
as well as attorneys' fees and litigation costs for the employee
98
plaintiff.
Under Midgett,99 despite the availability of federal remedies to
make the aggrieved employee whole, 100 an Illinois employee does
87. Id
88. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
89. Bowen, 459 U.S. at 215.

Id at 214-15.
Id at 215.
Id
Id.
94. Id at 230 (White, J., dissenting).
90.
91.
92.
93.

95. The Court stated that: "When the union, as the exclusive agent of the

employee, waives arbitration or fails to seek review of an adverse decision, the
employer should be in substantially the same position as if the employee had
had the right to act on his own behalf and had done so." Id at 226.
The Court reasoned that, in effect, but for the union's failure to handle the
grievance the employer's liability for damages would have been fixed as of the
date an arbitrator should have ruled in the employee's favor. Id The dissent
disagreed and stated that the employer could mitigate his liability for damages
at any time by reinstating the discharged employee. Id at 239 (White, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this argument on the theory that the employer
could reasonably have assumed that the union's silence indicated its conclusion
that the discharge was justified. Id at 226-27 n.15.
96. Id

97. The Court stated that if the employer is unable to collect damages from
the union, the employer is secondarily responsible for the damages assessed

against
98.
99.
100.

the union. Id,at 223 n.12.
Id at 223.
See supra note 17.
Bowen, 459 U.S. at 222.
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not have any logical reason to exercise his rights under federal labor law. The practical effect of the Midgett decision is to put Illinois unions on notice that they need not process grievances for
wrongful discharge. The employee plaintiff can obtain a windfall
punitive damages award against the employer under Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.10 1 and Midgett, but cannot recover such an award under
the remedies provided by federal law. 10 2 Therefore, unless the employer defendant is insolvent, or nearly so, the aggrieved employee
has absolutely no reason to pursue an action against the union.
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Midgett was unnecessary because of the existence of adequate remedies under federal
law. The Midgett holding has unjustifiably undermined an entirely
adequate network of federal labor law remedies for wrongful actions by employers and unions by removing any practical incentive
a discharged union employee might have for utilizing these remedies. In fact, hostile former employees may often elect to cause exemployers the greatest possible difficulty by instituting civil actions
which are burdensome and costly10 3 for the employer and prone to
10 4
settlement even if frivolous.
THE MIDGETT PERVERSION OF THE
, DAMAGES

DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE

While it has been shown that the federal preemption doctrine
should have been applied in Midgett, the Illinois Supreme Court
nevertheless opted to focus its attention upon the need for uniform
deterrence of employer conduct which impairs the exercise of employee rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. 10 5 Accordingly, the court extended the tort action of retaliatory discharge to
1°
union employees to effectuate the desired uniform deterrence. 6
In failing to adequately balance the public policy interest supported
by such an extension with the policy interests undermined by the
101. See supra note 24.
102. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). This
decision was based on the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The availability
of punitive damages in the context of cases arising under the National Labor
Relations Act has not been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court.
However, the Court, in Bowen noted that the Foust rule was consistent with the
Bowen holding. Bowen, 459 U.S. at 237 n.7. Since a union's duty of fair representation arises under both of the acts, it is likely that the Court will bar punitive damages against a union under the NLRA when, and if, the issue is
squarely presented.
103. See infra text accompanying note 153.
104. For a contrary opinion concerning the suitability of grievance and arbitration procedures for resolving a wrongful discharge when the union fails to
process such grievance, see Tobias, A Pleafor the Wrongfully DischargedEmployee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 55 (1972).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.30 (1983).
106. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 147, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
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extension, the Illinois Supreme Court improperly employed the
doctrine of punitive damages.
The doctrine of punitive damages is almost universally recognized in the United States.1 0 7 Although punitive damages have
been frequently criticized, 08 courts seem favorably disposed to
award such damages in most common law actions involving intentional or wilful misconduct. 10 9 Punishment and deterrence are the
objectives of punitive damages in the modern law."i0 Their function, therefore, is similar to that of a criminal penalty."'
Enforcement of public policy is most often stated as the basis
for an award of punitive damages;" i 2 however, where a punitive
107. Only four states outrightly disallow the recovery of punitive damages:
Louisiana, Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541
(1917); Massachusetts, Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E.
680 (1914); Nebraska, Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960);
Washington, Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,25 P. 1072 (1891).
108. See, e.g., K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.4(A) (1980); Willis, Measure of Damages When Propertyis Wrongfully Taken by a PrivateIndividual,
22 HARv. L. REV. 419 (1909).
The doctrine has been termed "a pernicious doctrine," a "heresy" and a
"deformity." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). See also Murphy v. Hobbs,
7 Colo.541, 5 P. 119 (1884). It has also been termed an "incongruity" and "a sin
against sound judicial principle." Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 286-88
(1878). The Illinois courts have also been critical of the doctrine of punitive
damages. As early as 1872, the Illinois Supreme Court expressed serious doubt
concerning the validity of the doctrine. Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294, 298
(1872). The Holmes court stated that "damages should be precisely commensurate with the injury, neither more nor less." Id.at 297. The Holmes court
voiced further concern about the inconsistency involved when the courts mix
the interests of society with those of the individual plaintiff. Id.at 297-98.
109. See, e.g., Rainbolt v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Stowell
v. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (S.D. Fla. 1980), affd, 641 F.2d
323 (5th Cir. 1981); Sabath v. Mansfield, 60 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1015, 377 N.E.2d
161, 168 (1978); Mattyasovszky v. West Town Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 51, 313
N.E.2d 496, 499 (1974), affd, 61 Ill. 2d 509, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975); K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.9 (1980).
110. E.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 248 (1981); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979); In re Air
Crash Near Chicago, Illinois on May 24, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 613 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d
1122, 1123, 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1059 (1981).
The punishment imposed by the court upon the wrongdoer satisfies, to an
extent, the victim's and society's desire for revenge and therefore, renders selfhelp unnecessary. Note, CriminalSafeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 408 (1967). However, it has been argued that punishment and deterrence properly belong within the realm of criminal law, which
has developed safeguards to insure that the punishment imposed will be fair.
McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,27 DE PAUL
L. REV. 571, 582 (1978).
111. Holt v. Cross, 121 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697, 460 N.E.2d 8, 9 (1983); Cornell v.
Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474-75, 440 N.E.2d 985, 987 (1982).
112. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186-87, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359
(1978). In Kelsay the Illinois Supreme Court held that "[t]he imposition on the
employer of the small additional obligation to pay a wrongfully discharged employee compensation would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatory
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damages award would frustrate more important public policy concerns, such an award will be denied. 113 The penal nature of punitive damages is not favored in the law' 1 4 and therefore, courts have
been cautioned to "exercise a high degree of watchfullness to prevent the doctrine from being perverted and extended beyond the
principles upon which it is based."' 15
Despite the existence of a strong public policy favoring the
unimpaired access to relief under the Workers' Compensation
Act, 116 the employment of punitive damages in Midgett was inapi7
propriate. In attempting to promote one important public policy,"
the court effectively undermined several other state and federal
public policy concerns."i 8 To employ the doctrine of punitive damages in this manner is to pervert and extend it in such a way so as to
defeat the very principles upon which it is based.
The Burden of Midgett on FederalLabor Policy and Commerce
The modern history of congressional and judicial activity concerning labor/management relations can best be understood as a
struggle to attain a delicate balance between the economic power of
employers and the organized collective power of labor unions. 119 To
achieve this desired end, Congress deemed it necessary to develop a
strong federal policy to govern relations between labor and management.1 20 In enacting the National Labor Relations Act,1 2 ' Congress
discharge, which mocks the public policy of this State." Id. Applying this reasoning, the Kelsay court determined that the imposition of punitive damages

was necessary to enforce the state public policy. Id. See also Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d

at 147, 473 N.E.2d at 1284 (punitive damages imposed to enforce state public
policy).
113. See Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 598, 147 N.E.2d 321, 327 (1958).
114. E.g., Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 102 (6th Cir. 1980); Payne v. Government of D.C., 559 F.2d 809, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hammond v. North Am.
Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 211, 454 N.E.2d 210, 219 (1983).
115. See, e.g., Yearian v. Columbia Nat. Bank of Columbia, 86 111. App. 3d 508,
514, 408 N.E.2d 63, 68 (1980).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.30 (1983). See Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at
147, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
117. The Midgett holding was a direct result of the court's intense desire to
enforce the Illinois public policy in favor of protecting employees in the exercise of their rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at
147, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
118. See infra notes 119-54 and accompanying text.
119. Note, Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America-An Unfortunate DepartureFrom the Vigorous Enforcement of the Proarbitration
Policy
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 6 J. CORP. L. 195 (1980).
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).

121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act was
designed to eliminate unfair labor practices that impinge upon the employees'
rights to associate and bargain collectively. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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established an exclusive 22 system of rights and responsibilities controlling the employment relationship. Central to this system is the
concept of collective bargaining with respect to the terms and conditions of employment.' 23 Good faith negotiation between the employer and the union and the administration of the agreement
reached between them are both encouraged and governed by the
Act. 1 24 The National Labor Relations Act 25 clearly contemplates
the establishment of a binding contractual relationship between
26
these parties.'
27
Both the courts and the National Labor Relations Board
have long emphasized the process of collective bargaining and
grievance arbitration as the appropriate and ideal method for
resolving disputes between labor and management.' 28 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently designated the collective bargaining agreement as the best means of avoiding indus30
trial strife.' 29 For this reason, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
the Court held that an employee must attempt to utilize the griev122. When the conduct at issue in the employment relationship is even arguably subject to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, the federal
scheme of rights and remedies preclude any attempt to utilize state remedies.
See supra note 70.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the scope of this federal
scheme as being a "comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory
arrangements that Congress set up in the NLRA to govern labor-management
relations affecting interstate commerce." International Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
123. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
124. Section 151 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Section 152(d) of the Act further provides that collective bargaining "is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
29 U.S.C.
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
§ 152(d) (1982).
125. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
126. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
127. See supra note 5.
128. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1984); General
Dynamics Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86
(1984).
129. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 378
(1974); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
130. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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ance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement
before seeking redress in the courts under other theories of liability. 3 1 The Court established this rule to protect the integrity of the
collective bargaining process and to promote that aspect of national
labor policy which encourages private, rather than judicial, resolu132
tion of labor disputes.
The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Midgett drastically upsets the complex and interrelated scheme of employer/employee
rights created by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act.
Furthermore, the Midgett decision wholly undermines and ignores
the national labor policy favoring collective bargaining and grievance arbitration, processes which have been openly encouraged by
Congress, 3 3 the United States Supreme Court, 3 4 and the National
Labor Relations Board. 3 5 Therefore, in attempting to promote the
state public policy in favor of protecting the rights of employees
under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Midgett court has un136
dermined other public policy concerns of national magnitude.
For example, the arbitration process is the primary mechanism
for the resolution of disputes arising under collective bargaining
131. Id. at 652. In Maddox, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that:
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely
sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to
commend it. In addition to cutting across the interests already mentioned,
it would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform
and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a
grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
Id. at 653.
132. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976). Many
commentators have voiced concern about the courts' lack of expertise and familiarity with problems of the workplace. Such commentators suggest that
these matters are better left to those more acquainted with labor and its
problems. See, e.g., Hogler, Employee Discipline and Due Process Rights: Is
There An AppropriateRemedy? 33 LAB. L.J. 783 (1982); Minnemeier, Protection From Unjust Discharges: An ArbitrationScheme, 19 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 49
(1982).
133. Section 173(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act states:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last
resort and in exceptional cases.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
136. See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 148, 473 N.E.2d 1280,
1285 (1984).
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agreements in American labor law today. 137 The requirement that
union employees utilize the grievance procedures provided in the
collective bargaining agreement is one of the most valuable tradeoffs such employees accept in exchange for the many benefits they
receive to which they would otherwise not be legally entitled.13 8
Indeed, there is little doubt that certain benefits accrue only to
employees who are represented by a union. The employees gain
union representation at the bargaining table where wages, benefits,
and other terms and conditions of employment are determined
through negotiation.1 3 9 Union employees benefit further from representation in the processing of any work-related grievance that
may arise. 140 Most importantly, the employer is required by law to
recognize and bargain in good faith with the union. 141 This aspect
of the labor law fabric makes union representation and collective
bargaining agreements both desirable and workable by disposing of
the employers' heretofore unilateral management power over the
employment relationship.
Illinois employers also benefit from the collective bargaining
agreement. Such agreements provide predictability of results,
speedy resolution of disputes, and known and agreed upon procedures, costs, and expenditures. 142 These advantages make doing
business less burdensome and more profitable for employer and
143
employee alike.
137. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 914 (1978). The arbitration
process has become so popular as a method for resolving disputes because it
provides incentives to both the employer and employee regarding settlement of
their differences. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974),
the United States Supreme Court recognized this by stating that:
Arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer
and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to make available the
conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration which may satisfy an
employee's perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving the
employer the expense and aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and misunderstandings or discriminatory practices that might
otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial forum.

Id,
138. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1289 (Moran, J., dissenting). For
a general list of benefits provided to union employees see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
139. See supra note 36.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
141. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
142. Grievance and arbitration provisions are found in almost all formal collective bargaining agreements in the United States. Because these processes are
determined in advance, they provide a predictable route to resolution.
143. The less capital that is required in the grievance resolution process, the
more capital there will be available for business growth and employer benefits.
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If Midgett is allowed to stand,1 44 other policy concerns will also
suffer irreparable harm. Employers, under Midgett, will be subject
to civil litigation for wrongful discharge, both civil and criminal
sanctions under the provisions of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, 145 as well as liability under the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement protecting against termination
without just cause. 146 Neither Congress nor the Illinois General
Assembly intended for such a multiplicity of remedies to be afforded to an employee who has been wrongfully terminated. This
would inevitably lead to multiple and duplicative litigation for single wrongs, creating a disfavorable business climate for Illinois employers and adding to the present Illinois court congestion and costs
14 7
to taxpayers.
The inescapable result of Midgett is the destruction of the Illinois business climate. The costs of doing business in Illinois will
escalate as a result of this decision. Management may naturally opt
144. Midgett was a four to three split decision. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc., 105 Ill. 2d at 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984). The attorneys for Sackett-Chicago, Inc. are currently in the process of preparing a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Midgett decision by the United States Supreme
Court.
145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.30 (1983).
146. The Midgett decision permits the union employee to bypass contract
remedies and pursue instead an independent action in tort. See supra text accompanying note 19. Midgett, however, does not remove from the employee the
option to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement through the
grievance procedures provided by the agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Midgett allows the employee to opt for the route to the remedy
which is in his or her best interest, resulting in multiple paths to remedy for the
employee and no similar selection process for the employer.
147. The Midgett decision, in effect, opens the courthouse doors to a swarm
of various alternative public policy claims supporting a wrongful discharge tort
action.
Indicative of this is the fact that in late January of 1985, the Illinois
Supreme Court heard arguments in three cases where the plaintiffs brought
retaliatory discharge actions against their former employers. Each case
presented the court with a different public policy as the basis for the discharge
being wrongful. In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., the plaintiff alleged that
he had been fired for refusing to work near a live source of radiation. 123 Ill.
App. 3d 539, 462 N.E.2d 1262 (1984) (Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal filed, No. 60181). In
Kelso-Burnett Co. v. Barr, the plaintiffs asserted that they had been fired in
violation of their right to free speech. fil. App. Ct. appeal dismissed, June 13,
1984 (Ill. Sup. Ct. appeal filed, No. 60426). Lastly, in Price v. Carmack Datsun,
Inc., No. 60446, the plaintiff alleged that he had been fired for filing a group
health insurance claim. 124 Ill. App. 3d 979, 464 N.E.2d 1245 (1984) (Ill. Sup. Ct.
appeal filed, No. 60446). For a discussion of these cases, see Chicago Daily L.
Bull., Jan. 31, 1985, at 1.
These three cases are but a few examples of the many which await court
resolution in the future. Focusing just on cases which involved workers' compensation claims will reveal the vast potential litigation that may be brought to
the Illinois courts. In December of 1983, the Illinois Industrial Commission reported its caseload volume for the previous two years as follows:
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to locate their businesses in other states1 48 that offer a more desirable business climate for them to prosper in, leaving Illinois and its
working population idle. 1 4 9 Therefore, the Midgett holding may,
through its resulting reduction of employment opportunities, injure
the very union employees which it seeks to assist and cause unneeded financial and industrial turmoil in Illinois.
The Burden of Midgett on the Illinois Court System and
Taxpayers
Congestion in the courts is a problem which spans the entire
United States.15° The potential number of retaliatory discharge
claims are numerous and will contribute greatly to the workload of
the courts.1 5 1 The Midgett holding, without increased judicial resources and public expense, will only worsen this serious
1 52
problem.
While the grievance procedures provided in collective bargaining agreements can be costly, they are almost invariably less expensive than litigation. 153 At-will employees have no alternative to
litigation and the public must provide a court system capable of

Total cases pending at end
of period
Total cases to be processed
Total new cases filed
Total cases closed:
(a) on arbitration
(b) on review

1982

1983

74,334
137,378
55,228

70,312
129,446
49,870

59,465
3,579
63,044

55,939
3,195
59,134

Industrial Commission of Illinois, Report on the Disposition of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Diseases Claims, Dec. 1983, at 1. These statistics
illustrate the potential number of claims for retaliatory discharge. Midgett not
only increases the number of these claims, but also removes them from the
private dispute resolution processes and places them upon the shoulders of the
court system.
148. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
149. Governor James R. Thompson of Illinois has been exerting great efforts
toward bringing more business to the State of Illinois. An example of these
efforts is the Governor's recent attempt to persuade General Motors Corporation to locate its new Saturn Corporation subsidiary and the division's 6,000 jobs
in Illinois. Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at 12. The Midgett decision clearly
decreases the chances of such a result.

150. See T.

CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED

(1978).

151. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. Sandver, Blaine & Woyar, Time and Cost Savings Through Expedited
Arbitration Procedures,36 ARB. J. 11, 20 (1981).
Trial courts must provide court reporters, judges, clerks and bailiffs. Furthermore, when juries are added, the time required to complete a trial is dramatically increased. Arbitrators, on the other hand, need only a court reporter
to hear the facts necessary to transcribe the hearing.
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handling these cases. In contrast, union employees have available
the less expensive arbitration alternative, which saves tax resources. Additionally, consumers benefit from the arbitration process because goods and services may be provided at a lower cost by
employers who are unencumbered by litigation expenses. Therefore, the general public, as well as the parties to collective bargaining agreements, have a substantial financial stake in the adherence
to the holding of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox.154 Until it is
clearly shown otherwise, grievance procedures should be endorsed
by the courts as an adequate means for resolving the disputes which
arise between labor and management. Midgett, in completely ignoring these concerns, adds to court congestion, while increasing the
financial burden on Illinois consumers and taxpayers.
Therefore, the application of common law tort actions and punitive damages to deter wrongful employee discharges cannot be ultimately justified because such use will result in greater harm to
employees and society. Less radical measures may be taken to
achieve the deterrence objective sought by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Midgett, which will maintain intact, the viability and utility of collective bargaining agreements.
A

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE MIDGETT-TYPE
CONTROVERSY

The federal preemption doctrine should be applied when adequate remedies are provided to the discharged union employee
under collective bargaining agreements and the federal labor law.
Therefore, state policies should not be enforced by the creation of
deterrent-oriented common law actions justified by the need for punitive damages. Furthermore, state legislative remedies in support
of local public policy should not be created when union employees
can be made whole within the existing federal labor law network;
namely, the remedies afforded through collective bargaining
agreements.
The desire to increase deterrence of employer misconduct
which violates state public policy can best be accomplished by
amending the Labor Management Relations Act. 155 This amendment would permit arbitrators of grievances under collective bargaining agreements to hear state statutory claims for damages
resulting from employer misconduct,' - 6 especially when such state
154. 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). See supra note 30.

155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
156. Arbitrators may only arbitrate disputes arising under provisions of collective bargaining agreements and may only interpret provisions of those agreements. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S.

593 (1960). See also 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 429 (1967) (matters subject to
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statutes are enacted after the execution of the particular collective
bargaining agreement. 157 Any erroneous adjudications of state statutory claims made by arbitrators under this scheme can ultimately
be resolved by an administrative appeal to the federal district
courts.' 5 8 Furthermore, states can limit this problem by guiding arbitrators in the interpretation of state statutes through the creation
of statutory definitions and regulations. While this proposal does
not entirely satisfy the deterrence objectives of state policymakers,
it balances the various policy concerns without the detrimental consequences of deterrent-oriented state civil actions.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to bring to light the foreseeable disruption of commercial activity and constructive labor/management
arbitration). However, Congress could authorize arbitrators under collective
bargaining agreements to hear state statutory claims which are deterrent-oriented. If an arbitrator has improperly applied the state law, such disputes could
ultimately be resolved by the state court system. Furthermore, the interpretation of state statutory claims can be clarified by statutory regulations and
definitions.
157. There are three basic options available to legislators and jurists with
respect to the handling of deterrent-oriented state remedies. First, such remedies could be held to be outside the jurisdiction of the states when employees
may obtain full compensation through their collective bargaining agreement
and the federal labor law scheme. The second option would be to liberally construe the right of states to fashion deterrent-oriented remedies whenever state
public policies may be undermined by employer misconduct. This approach will
lead to litigation as the norm for labor management dispute resolution instead
of arbitration proceedings.
The third option, and the one recommended, is to allow state deterrentoriented remedies to be made uniformly available to employees covered by collective bargaining agreements as well as those not covered by such agreements.
Certainly, arbitrators, as well as trial court fact finders, could award punitive
damages authorized by state judicial or legislative remedies. By permitting the
automatic amendment of collective bargaining agreements to include remedies
set forth by state statute for wrongful employee dismissal, the law would effectively accommodate the legitimate concerns of employee and employer alike
without undermining the collective bargaining process.
158. If such a case were to reach a United States district court, the court
would have jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
The NLRB is empowered to cede its jurisdiction to an agency of a state or
territory if the state or territory's statute regarding the labor dispute at issue is
not inconsistent with the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). This cessation of
jurisdiction may not be exercised where the labor dispute involves the mining,
manufacturing, communication or transportation industries. Id Further, the
power to determine whether the state or territorial statute conflicts with the
NLRA is vested with the NLRB. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
Therefore, primary determination of the state statutory action would
either be heard by the NLRB or ceded to the appropriate state or territorial
agency. If appropriated to a state or territorial agency, the parties would proceed on appeals pursuant to the local administrative appeal rules. If the NLRB
decides to hear the case, an aggrieved party can petition for relief to the appropriate United States district court. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
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relations resulting from the preoccupation of state legislative and
judicial policymakers with enforcement of local policy concerns.
Such interests will undoubtedly vary from state to state, ultimately
leading to the balkanization of law governing the organized workplace. As a result, some states will be perceived as more favorable
to employers, thereby leading to the unnecessary movement of employment opportunities and its related spin-off commercial activity.
Prompt action coordinated between state and federal lawmakers is
necessary to prevent this confusion and disruption of the economy.

